[COLUMN] Policy debates for S. Korea's next government

[Yonhap Photo]

(This article was contributed by Kim Yeon-chul, a professor at Inje University's department of Korean unification, to the East Asia Foundation on April 11 and allowed to be published by Aju Business Daily.)

The upcoming change in the administration of South Korea offers an important advantage regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. If the new South Korean administration actively seeks diplomatic solutions, the environment surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue can be transformed. Three changes in perception are necessary.

First, a long-term approach is needed. We must pursue a nuclear freeze ahead of denuclearization and create an environment of denuclearization by improving long-term relations.

Secondly, we need a mixed approach. In order to re-establish trust, “change through contact” in various areas is necessary. The third need is a multilateral approach. It is necessary to use a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula as an opportunity for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. First, in terms of specifics, the unstable armistice should be transformed into a permanent peace regime. At the same time as the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, we must begin four-party talks to discuss the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Third, we must pursue a virtuous cycle focusing on peace and the economy. Third, a decentralized North Korea policy is needed. South Korea should expand the role of its National Assembly, strengthen the role of local governments, and divide and distribute the roles that the government has been monopolizing in inter-Korean relations among the private sector.

Can South Korea Shake Hands with Nuclear North Korea?

The relationship between the two Koreas is currently at its lowest point. Dialogue is absent, trust has disappeared, and relations have deteriorated. Order in Northeast Asia is bleak. The North Korean nuclear issue is at the center of this predicament. It is both the result and the cause of deteriorating relationships. A decade has passed since the Six-Party Talks were halted. North Korea has since strengthened its deterrence capacity and the international community has responded with the “strongest sanctions yet,” at every instance. A vicious cycle of deterrence and sanctions has been repeated, worsening the situation.

South Korea’s incoming administration has inherited a difficult problem to solve. What should it do? First, regarding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, it is at a crossroads of either continuing sanctions or choosing an alternative route. Second, on the relationship between the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations, the choice is between whether to resolve the nuclear issue first or to cooperate on improving inter-Korean relations. Third, on the relationship between the nuclear issue and economic cooperation, the choice is between linking or separating the two issues.

A SWOT Analysis on the North Korean Nuclear Issue

The upcoming change in the administration of South Korea offers an important advantage regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. It is true that South Korea’s voice has become louder regarding North Korean issues since the 2000s. Neighboring countries respect the decisions taken by South Korea, one of the primary actors in the situation. The position of US President Barack Obama’s administration of “strategic patience” was the result of respect for the Lee Myung-bak administration's waiting strategy.

If the new South Korean administration actively seeks diplomatic solutions, the environment surrounding the North Korean nuclear can be transformed. Fortunately, the preferred solutions of the US and China on this issue are also changing. e Trump administration has concluded that the Obama administration's policy of "strategic patience" has failed. What remains is a military solution and a diplomatic solution, with the former not a viable alternative on the Korean Peninsula. If the Trump administration has a strong will to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and seeks a solution in a practical way, it can form a united front with the incoming South Korean administration. China’s exhaustion on the North Korean nuclear issue will also increase the possibility of active interventionist diplomacy.

e main weakness in this situation is a deterioration in the negotiating environment. Above all, North Korea’s nuclear capacity has changed. It is not easy to accurately evaluate the country’s nuclear capacity, but claims that the international community has been “underestimating” it are gaining sympathizers in the US. North Korea continues to produce nuclear materials through uranium enrichment, and has made nuclear warheads smaller, lighter, and standardized over the course of five nuclear tests. e means of transport have also changed. e North has developed various types of mobile missiles, has succeeded in launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and has increased the range of its long-range missiles. As the North's nuclear capabilities have changed, they will demand more in negotiations. As a result, the bargaining to achieve a nuclear freeze or nuclear abandonment will inevitably change. A new negotiating framework must be formed to reflect these new nuclear capacities.

Unfortunately, North Korea’s demands have increased while the domestic environment for negotiations to meet such demands has deteriorated. First, perceptions of North Korea have deteriorated to an incomparable level. e incoming South Korean administration’s ability to negotiate with North Korea will be limited if it takes a stance of abhorrence. e same is true for the US. A high level of negative perception of North Korea in a situation where stakeholders who can benefit from negotiations are limited will have a negative impact on negotiating attitudes.

If the North Korean nuclear issue moves in the direction of resolution, a window of opportunity opens. The level of development of inter-Korean relations can change and common interests can be pursued through economic cooperation. What is most important is the feasibility of an approach that focuses on South Korea’s approach to the economy of its northern neighbors. Connecting railway and gas pipelines has been discussed since Roh Tae-woo's so-called Nordpolitik. It has not yet been realized because inter-Korean relations have not been supportive of the plan. Progress on the North Korean nuclear issue can alleviate the risk of passing railways and pipelines through North Korea. The construction of a gas pipeline through North Korea is Russia's long-sought project. The larger the number of consumers, the more advantageous is one’s negotiating position on gas prices. The situation in Ukraine has blocked the western route for Russia, making exit to the east more important. The economic benefits of the South Korean market are not small, while North Korea can also collect gas as a transit fee. It is also interesting that Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, is the former CEO of ExxonMobil, which has a significant stake in the Sakhalin gas field. It is a project that the Trump administration may be interested in. is gas pipeline project could be carried out simultaneously with railway and road projects, which can be an opportunity to develop a multilateral Nord-economy.

To be sure, threats also exist. e diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will require a considerable amount of time, and will repeatedly stall due to a lack of trust. If the negotiations halt, the situation could easily return to the confrontation of the past. If arms race competition, such as the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system is replayed, not only would inter-Korean relations deteriorate, but also tension within Northeast Asia would escalate. If the conict over North Korea policy is revived in Northeast Asia, North Korea will further strengthen its deterrence capacity, a vicious cycle of provocations and sanctions would recur, and, crucially, the ideal moment to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue would be lost.

A New Approach to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

US Secretary of State Tillerson said on March 16 that “we have 20 years of a failed approach” and that “it is clear that a different approach is required.” But can there be a new and revolutionary policy? The military solution has too much to lose, negotiations have not been sustained, and the limit of sanctions are clear. If the best does not exist, we should instead avoid the worst. And we need to go back to the basics of policy making. We need to identify the intentions of North Korea, check for available policy resources to reflect changes, and find a more effective response. Three changes of perception are necessary before specific methods are sought.

The first is a long-term approach. The North Korean nuclear issue is the result of a prolonged conflict, so it is difficult to resolve it all at once. The idea of solving the issue over the course of a single span of time should perhaps be abandoned. It is difficult to settle with only one or two rounds of negotiations. For now, preventing deterioration is necessary. Following the current trend, some observers, such as Joel Witt, predict that North Korea's nuclear weapons will increase to a maximum of 100 by 2020. If it is dicult to solve immediately, we should halt at the current level. us, nuclear freezing before denuclearization is important. If frozen, we can buy time and proceed to a long-term process to create a relationship that does not require nuclear deterrence. Once you climb a hill, you will see the mountains to cross.

The second is a mixed approach. Since the North Korean nuclear issue is the product of deteriorating relations, the nature of the relationship must change before the problem can be resolved. Significant time and effort are necessary to improve the deteriorated relationship due to a lack of trust. In order to re-establish trust, “change through contact” in various areas is needed. In this regard, it is necessary to reaffirm the purpose of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in inter-Korean relations. e administration of former President Park Geun-hye shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex too easily because it considered it as a means of sanctions. e site of the complex is a key route for the North Korean Army to invade the South, and in this regard is an obstacle for them from pushing further south. e militaries of both North and South Korea were in charge of accessing and communicating with the Kaesong Industrial Complex. When the complex closed, the means of communication to prevent accidental clashes between the two countries’ militaries disappeared. ere are, of course, a number of issues that need to be considered for the resumption of business at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, including sanctions by the UN Security Council, changes in tenant company circumstances, and renegotiation of wages. However, in order to solve the North Korean nuclear issue, it is necessary to build trust, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex is the gateway to trust.

The third is a multilateral approach. South Korea is clearly one of the two most relevant actors in the Korean Peninsula issue. If the North Korean nuclear issue is not resolved and falls into a vicious cycle of an arms race, South Korea will suffer the most. In the past, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments have emphasized the principle of having the directly involved parties solve the issue. While the status and role of the main parties is still important, the importance of multilateral cooperation in the resolution process has increased. e North Korean nuclear issue is a product of the Cold War structure being imposed on the Korean Peninsula, but it is a pressing issue for Northeast Asia and a global concern. South Korea should seek collaborative action among neighboring countries, prepare mediating proposals, and actively manage the situation. Furthermore, a macro perspective is necessary to use a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula as an opportunity for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, and, at the same time, to include inter-Korean economic cooperation in the framework of a multilateral Nord-economy.

Advice for the Incoming Administration: Peace, Economy, and Decentralization

Peace is civil welfare. e most important goal of the government is to protect the lives, property and security of the people. If tensions escalate, anxieties increase, and economic opportunities decrease, that is a security failure. The process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue should lead to the improvement of people's lives. Genuine security requires two wings to fly: peace and economic prosperity.

South Korea’s incoming administration should not forget the time-honored task of transforming an unstable armistice into a permanent peace regime. The process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is a process of creating a peace regime, and, at the same time, realizing a "practically unified" Korea. We should now start four-party talks – including the two Koreas, the US, and China – to create a "peace regime on the Korean Peninsula," already agreed upon in the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005, while restarting the Six Party Talks. There is a good reason to hold separate four-party talks to discuss the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, separate from the Six-Party Talks. e four members mentioned were the major combatants in the Korean War and thus hold the responsibility to transform the armistice of that war into a peace regime. ey already have an experience of four-party talks, in Geneva in the late 1990s. If the four-party talks start, they can begin from where they left off. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, suggested the timely pursuance of both denuclearization and a peace treaty when he met with Secretary Tillerson this March.

Second, we must pursue a virtuous circle of peace and economic prosperity. Political, military, and economic cooperation should complement each other in inter-Korean relations. Multilateral economic cooperation at the regional level in Northeast Asia is an important means to solving the North Korean nuclear issue. For South Korea, a Nord-economy is an opportunity to secure growth potential, earn time for industrial restructuring, and expand its economic space. Projects such as the inter-Korean gas pipeline or the Northeast Asian transport network connection can circumvent the decades-old prejudice that bilateral inter-Korean economic cooperation is a case of giving charity to North Korea. Of course, Nord-economy should lead to the improvement of South Korean economic fundamentals. It should reform the transportation system from being road-centered to railway-centered, support SMEs that can take part in bilateral or multilateral economic cooperation, and transform the border area into a peaceful economic zone.

ird, a decentralized North Korea policy is needed. The North Korean policy should not become a reservoir of ideological con‑icts or a basis for political confrontation. In order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and open up opportunities for peace and co-prosperity in inter-Korean relations, we must gather wisdom. Sharing power is a shared responsibility, and also helps to shape consensus. First, the role of the South Korean National Assembly should be expanded. In the process of establishing a mid- to long-term policy towards North Korea such as the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act, bipartisan cooperation is naturally required. At the same time, the role of local governments is also important. In the process of German reunification, city-led exchanges had an important role. The central government exercising sole authority in inter-Korean relations is not compatible with the purpose of decentralization. It is also important to divide and distribute the roles that the government has been monopolizing in inter-Korean relations to the private sector.

South Korea hasn’t shaken hands with nuclear North Korea for the past decade. What results can we see? The relationship has deteriorated and the solution to the North Korean nuclear issue has become invisible. What did we gain by rejecting dialogue? e purposes of dialogue are diverse. e most important one is to understand the opponent’s intentions. Of course, we should not be optimistic just because negotiations have resumed. Negotiations will be difficult, often frustrating, and will sometimes result in retreats.

However, to escape from the vicious cycle of provocation and sanctions, we must separate ourselves from failed diplomacy. To resolve the nuclear issue, long-term efforts to change the nature of the relationship should begin. We should be able to shake hands with nuclear North Korea to find opportunities to resolve the nuclear issue.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official position of the East Asia Foundation.

Park Sae-jin swatchsjp@ajunews.com

[COLUMN] Policy debates for S. Korea's next government

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